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ABSTRACT
There has been a revival of interest in the last couple of decades on two intersecting topics—the
political theory and importance of the “forgotten” American founder and Reformed minister,
John Witherspoon, and the natural theology and natural law in the Reformed theological
tradition. Witherspoon, as president of Princeton, had much to say about natural theology and
natural law, and many scholars have attempted to understand his relationship to Enlightenment
thought and Christian orthodoxy, yet there has been no attempt by scholars to bring recent
scholarship on Reformed theology to bear on our understanding of his thought. The dominant
view in the literature is that Witherspoon’s view and use of natural theology, natural law, reason
and philosophy indicate a compromise or inconsistency with his otherwise theological Reformed
Orthodoxy—a move towards a type of “enlightened orthodoxy” or “Christian rationalism.”
After reviewing the primary and secondary sources, I contend that the literature is in need of
significant correction. I provide here both a corrective and contribute to the literature by showing
that Witherspoon’s thought on these subjects—which, broadly speaking, concerns the
relationship of reason to revelation—is consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy. I further argue that
Reformed Orthodoxy, when properly understood, permitted Witherspoon and the other orthodox
Founders to participate in and give approval of the various founding events and documents of the
Founding era without violating their theological principles.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been a revival of interest in the last couple of decades on two intersecting
topics—the political theory and importance of the “forgotten” American founder and Reformed 1
minister, John Witherspoon (1723-1794), and the natural theology and natural law in the
Reformed theological tradition.2 Witherspoon, as president of Princeton,3 had much to say about
natural theology and natural law, and many scholars have attempted to understand his
relationship to Enlightenment thought and Christian orthodoxy, yet there has no attempt by
scholars to bring recent scholarship on Reformed theology to bear on our understanding of his
thought.4 The dominant view in the literature is that Witherspoon’s view and use of natural
theology, natural law, reason and philosophy indicate a compromise or inconsistency with his
otherwise theological Reformed Orthodoxy—a move towards a type of “enlightened orthodoxy”
or “Christian rationalism.” After reviewing the primary and secondary sources, I contend that
contemporary scholarship is in need of significant correction. I provide here both a corrective
and contribute to the literature by showing that Witherspoon’s thought on these subjects—which,

I use the words “Reformed” and “Calvinist” interchangeably.
For recent scholarship in natural law and natural theology in the Reformed tradition see Stephen J.
Grabill Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing, 2006); David VanDrunen Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the
Development of Reformed Social Thought (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2010);
Richard Muller After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (New York: Oxford
University press, 2003) and Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of
Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003) and John
Patrick Donnelly Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and Grace (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1976).
3
Princeton University, originally named College of New Jersey in 1746, was renamed in 1896. I refer to
the college as “Princeton” throughout the thesis.
4
Jeffry H. Morrison compares Witherspoon’s political with Calvinist political theory, but not in terms of
reason and revelation. See John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 81.
1
2
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broadly speaking, concerns the relationship of reason to revelation5—is consistent with
Reformed Orthodoxy.
I.

Introduction and summary of the argument
Scholars have long considered Witherspoon to be an enigma. Setting aside the issue at

hand, all recognize that he was theologically orthodox throughout his life.6 He did not succumb
to the popularity of Arminianism, nor does he show influence from the theology of the
Socinians, Unitarians, and deists, all of which increased in legitimacy in the 18th century. He
remained committed to the Reformed faith to the end. However, most scholars allege a certain
inconsistency in his thought. Despite being a fierce critic of the so-called “Moderates” of
Scotland during his career in Scotland for their elitism and cozy relationship with Enlightenment
philosophers (such as David Hume), Witherspoon adopted, many say, an Enlightenment or
naturalistic approach to morality and appropriated many popular ideas among the intellectual
elite of his time soon after he arrived in America. His Lectures on Moral Philosophy, the
capstone lecture series for all his graduating students at Princeton (of which Witherspoon was the
president throughout the Founding era), was an “inquiry into the nature and grounds of moral
obligation by reason, as distinct from revelation.”7 Contained in the Lectures are the ideas of
Thomas Reid, Francis Hutcheson, John Locke and others; and his outline is likely borrowed from

In this essay, “reason” is any philosophical inquiry apart from revelation, such as natural law reasoning.
Though admittedly not precise, by “revelation” I refer to special revelation i.e., scriptural revelation.
Technically, in Reformed Orthodoxy reason is an inquiry concerning natural revelation, since God has
revealed himself as Creator in nature. But I follow convention and Witherspoon’s terminology by using
“revelation” for special/scriptural revelation.
6
By “orthodox,” I refer to Reformed Orthodoxy, which includes the historic positions of Christianity as
expressed by the Apostles, Nicene, and Caledonian creeds plus the distinctive Calvinist doctrines
(covenantalism, the “five points” of Calvinism, sovereignty of God, etc.).
7
John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Edited by Jack Scott (Newark: University of
Delaware Press, 1982), 64. I refer to these lectures as simply “Lectures” throughout the paper.
5
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Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy.8 In the final lecture, Witherspoon mentions a few
“considerable authors,” such as Gottfried Leibnitz, Samuel Clarke, David Hume, and the
“deistical writers.” To most scholars, Witherspoon’s approach contradicts the traditional
Calvinist doctrines of sola scriptura and total depravity, both which preclude, they claim, natural
law reasoning, the development of a natural theology, the legitimacy of the use of reason apart
from revelation, and the legitimacy of philosophy. For the good Calvinist, scriptural revelation9
is the exclusive and sufficient source for Christian duty in both ethics and politics. Natural reason
is, at best, superfluous and likely dangerous. Scholars conclude that Witherspoon is inconsistent,
even “philosophically schizophrenic,” as one recently put it.10
This paper shows that these scholars are mistaken. Witherspoon’s approach or method of
inquiry is consistent with the Reformed tradition. I have the following theses: 1. Witherspoon
understands reason and philosophy to be ancillary, confirmatory, and supportive of special
revelation, not above special revelation or the rule of revelation, and therefore he is consistent
with the Reformed theological tradition. 2. Witherspoon’s understanding of the limits of reason,
namely, that reason is limited to inquiry concerning natural objects (not supernatural ones, such
as the Trinity), is consistent with the Reformed tradition. 3. Witherspoon’s construction of a
system of natural theology, his use of natural law reasoning, and his offering proofs or evidence
apart from special revelation for both the existence of God and certain doctrines of natural

Jack Scott, “Introduction,” in Lectures on Moral Philosophy (Lectures), 27-28. He notes, however, that
“Witherspoon’s ethical philosophy owes more to [Joseph] Butler [1692-1752] than to any other thinker,”
37-38.
9
“Scriptural revelation” is the in-scripturated word of God – God’s message to man in the form of the
written word. Most Protestants believe that the “deposit of faith” has been exclusively and sufficiently
deposited in the form of the written word. There is no other equal authority, nor another deposit from
which one can encounter or discover the doctrines of faith.
10
Gregg Frazer, The Religious Beliefs of America’s Founders: Reason, Revelation, and Revolution
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 41.
8
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religion (e.g., the immortality of the soul and that God desires and ought to be worshiped) do not
violate the Reformed tradition. 4. Witherspoon intentionally safeguards supernatural truths from
the standards of reason, sharing the primary concern of Reformed theologians that reason not be
the standard by which supernatural truth is judged. 5. Witherspoon’s Reformed framework for
understanding reason and revelation makes possible, without any unprincipled compromise of
this theological convictions, constructive participation with less-than-orthodox colleagues in the
American founding
I support these positions below with a concise discussion on the Reformed theological
development of the 17th and 18th centuries, often named “Reformed scholasticism,” and an
analysis of the theology of Genevan theologian Bénédict Pictet (1655–1724), a theologian
Witherspoon studied while at the University of Edinburgh and whose principal text on theology,
Christian Theology,11 Witherspoon kept in his personal library throughout his life.12 I then
analyze the works of Witherspoon, focusing primarily on his Lectures and his Lectures on
Divinity, showing that Witherspoon, far from being an adherent of “enlightened orthodoxy” or an
unprincipled compromiser of his theological tradition, is consistent, at least formally, with the
Reformed tradition on the relationship of reason and revelation. Understanding this consistency
explains how he and other orthodox Founders could participate constructively in the Founding
and it allows a unique and nuanced perspective on the issue of Christianity's relationship to the
Founding.
Clearing up this confusion on Witherspoon’s thought is important for a few reasons. This
study is best viewed as a case study for a more general argument that one could equally and

11

Benedict Pictet, Christian Theology, Translated by Frederick Reyroux (Philadelphia: Presbyterian
Board of Publication, 1834). From here on, I refer to this text as CT.
12
See Scott, “Appendix 2,” in Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 201.
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successfully apply to other key Founders, such as James Wilson, John Jay, Roger Sherman, and
many others.13 Given this lineup of orthodox Reformed and important participants in the
American founding, the general argument, if successful, calls into question popular theses on the
American founding, represented in recent works of Michael Zuckert,14 Benjamin Lynerd,15
Gregg Frazer,16 and Matthew Stewart.17 Indeed, if I am correct, then these works contain
significant misunderstandings and poor interpretations of both the Reformed tradition and the
religious beliefs of many Founders. This study of Witherspoon, then, is a case study pointing to
the need for a substantial revision of much of the current scholarship on religion and the
Founding. The set of problems in the scholarship on Witherspoon is a microcosm of a much
broader misunderstanding.
Moreover, as a delegate to the Second Continental Congress, signer of the Declaration of
Independence, signer of the Articles of Confederation, and an active supporter of the
Constitution, Witherspoon’s own participation in the Founding makes him an important Founder.
He was also in a position to influence, perhaps better than anyone, many in the Founding era and
beyond. Jeffry Morrison compiled a list of the government positions held by Witherspoon’s
former students:
The list of his Princeton graduates reads like a roll of early American notables. Among
these were twelve members of the Continental Congress; five delegates to the
Constitutional Convention; one U.S. president (Madison); a vice president (the notorious
Aaron Burr); forty-nine U.S. representatives; twenty-eight U.S. senators; three Supreme

See Mark David Hall’s list of Reformed or “Calvinist” founders in Roger Sherman and the Creation of
the American Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.
14
Michael Zuckert, “Natural Rights and Protestant Politics,” in Protestantism and the American
Founding Edited by Thomas S. Engeman and Michael P. Zuckert. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2004.
15
Benjamin T. Lynerd, Republican Theology: The Civil Religion of American Evangelicals (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
16
Frazer, The Religious Beliefs of America’s Founders.
17
Matthew Stewart, Nature’s God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2014).
13
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Court justices; eight U.S. district judges; one secretary of state; three attorneys general;
and two foreign ministers.18

He had the respect of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, Thomas Jefferson and
George Washington. Indeed, “Witherspoon’s contemporaries…ranked him high among that
generation we call the founders.”19 Highlighting Witherspoon’s influence on James Madison,
Douglass Adair even claimed that “since James Madison became one of the chief architects of
our political democracy…his sojourn at Nassau Hall under the tutelage of the learned Dr. John
Witherspoon was of incalculable importance to the destiny of the United States.”20 This is likely
an exaggeration, since Madison never refers to Witherspoon as an influence on his political
thought. Still, Witherspoon as a college president was in one of the best positions to directly and
personally shape the thought of Madison and the Founding generation. If college professors
influence their students, it is hard to deny that Witherspoon had some influence on his.
The nature and extent of that influence is hard to trace, and the point of this study is not
to determine clear influence. The issue I directly address is whether Witherspoon’s capstone
lecture series advocated an approach to questions of theology, morality, and politics that
contradicts Reformed Orthodoxy. Do the arguments and content of Lectures, when properly
understood, lead one necessarily to reject the Reformed Orthodox (and, generally speaking,
Protestant orthodox) view of the relationship of reason and revelation? If Lectures does not lead
to such a rejection, then those who heard them came to reject Reformed Orthodoxy followed
their intellectual path for another reason. If my argument is correct, then rejecting Reformed

18

Morrison, 4.
Ibid, 13.
20
See Fame and the Founding Fathers, Edited by Trevor Colbourn (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974),
124. Quoted in Morrison, 14.
19
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Orthodoxy on the relationship of reason and revelation does not follow from hearing and
studying Lectures.
When Reformed Orthodoxy is properly understood, it becomes clear that nothing that
Witherspoon does in his lectures should lead one to reject orthodox faith. I show below that
Calvinists can legitimately use reason and philosophy to construct a system of natural theology
and a system of natural law and can affirm a universal moral sense and universal set of ethics for
both the Christian and non-Christian—all apart from any appeal to revelation. Reformed
Orthodox Christians both can and did such inquiry without violating theological principles. Far
from advocating for a type of compromised faith, Witherspoon’s arguments in Lectures actually
show how a Reformed Christian could consistently participate in the Founding using exclusively
natural law arguments, could deliberate on these arguments with heterodox21 colleagues, and
could share positions on natural theology and natural law with the heterodox without accepting
any unprincipled compromises.

II.

Literature Review
The scholarship on Witherspoon’s understanding of the relationship of reason and

revelation has two tendencies: either scholars fail to address the relationship or they claim that
Witherspoon’s appeal to reason apart from revelation is inconsistent with Reformed Orthodoxy.
Morrison, despite producing a fine and useful treatment of Witherspoon’s political theory, does
not address the issue. Nor does Varnum Collins, in his 20th century biography of Witherspoon,

By “heterodoxy” here and throughout this paper, I refer to deviations from historic Christian orthodoxy
as codified by the various widely recognized and accepted creeds of the Christian theological tradition
(e.g., the Apostles’, Nicene, and Chalcedonian creeds). Anti-trinitarianism and denying the deity of Christ
(traditionally understood), then, are heterodox positions.
21
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mention the problem.22 The works that do raise the issue and claim inconsistency rarely provide
any discussion on the Calvinist view of reason and revelation and rely largely on assumptions. In
particular, they rely on this crucial assumption: that the Reformed tradition includes a rejection
of reason and philosophy and requires a strictly biblicist23 understanding of faith, ethics, and
political theory. The Bible (or scriptural special revelation) exclusively contains the duties of
man to God and to man. Frazer discusses at length the religious beliefs of certain, though not all,
key Founders (including Witherspoon), and yet he fails to provide any discussion on the
relationship of reason and revelation in the Reformed tradition. He assumes that Witherspoon’s
“set[ting] aside the Scriptures” to do philosophy means that he has “succumbed to the
[Enlightenment] spirit of the age.”24 All but a few works that discuss Witherspoon’s philosophy
fail to provide sufficient justification for the claim that the Reformed tradition rejects reason,
natural law, natural theology, philosophy, universal moral sense, etc.
One of the central claims of scholars is that Witherspoon’s political and moral thought
has “a frankly naturalistic bias” that lacks a “genuinely Christian approach to public life.”25 His
attempt to develop a moral system from nature admitted, says Noll et al., that “the Christian God
[did not] have a specific role to play in public life, where the rule of nature prevailed.”26 Looking
to nature was the approach of the deist and the “theistic rationalist,” to use Frazer’s label. For
22

Varnum Lansing Collins, President Witherspoon (New York: Arno Press, 1969).
Biblicism, simply put, is the view that the Bible is not only the principal and sufficient source of duty,
but the exclusive source. This usually entails the rejection of any epistemic common ground between
believer and non-believer. Though popular today among the Reformed Christian community, it is not the
dominant position of the Reformed tradition.
24
Frazer, 46. Frazer is the worst offended in this regard. His entire book, thought filled with interesting
details on the religious views of the founders and a useful corrective to those who would simplistically
declare the Founding to be secular or Christian, purports to show that many of the Founders violated their
Christian theological tradition, yet he provides no discussion on the relationship of reason and revelation
in the Protestant tradition.
25
Mark A. Noll, Nathan O. Hatch, and George M. Marsden, The Search for Christian America
(Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1983), 90.
26
Ibid, 91.
23
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both Jack Scott and Frazer, it is his approach to moral thought that is inconsistent with his
orthodoxy. As Frazer writes, “Witherspoon’s emphasis was on method or approach or how to
think about religion and politics—and his approach was decidedly rationalistic and
naturalistic.”27 Scott agrees: “Throughout the Lectures Witherspoon employs reason with a
confidence atypical of earlier Calvinism. He reflects a phenomenon of his time: rationalism had
entered the house of Calvinism.”28 To Frazer, this creates a certain irreconcilable division in his
thought between “Witherspoon the Calvinist” and “Witherspoon the rationalist and naturalist.”
No Calvinist, according to him, would look to nature, without the immediate lens of scripture, to
discover moral truths. “Unlike many Christian authors before him,” Frazer writes, “Witherspoon
did not see full employment of man’s fallen reason as an inherently flawed path to knowledge or
as a threat to revelation.”29 The crucial premise for these critiques of Witherspoon is that nature
has little to no role in Reformed theological ethics. In order for the “Christian God” to have a
role in public life, all duties must come exclusively from scripture; only in scripture does one
find the Christian God. The god of nature is the god of the deists. The ethics of scripture
abrogates, supersedes and, seemingly, destroys natural law. The law of God is not found in, nor
accessible from, nature; and the moral law of scripture is not the same in substance as that found
in nature. Nature is nothing but red in tooth and claw. These are the assumptions, at least, of
Witherspoon’s recent interpreters.
Scholars also claim that since Witherspoon held positions in common with certain
heterodox writers of the 18th century, he must have adhered to a type of enlightened orthodoxy.

27

Frazer, 40.
Scott, “Introduction,” 39-40.
29
Frazer, 42. One would like to know who these “Christian authors” are. Frazer, unfortunately, provides
no such discussion.
28

9

Scott, for example, points out that Witherspoon had similar positions as the heterodox writers
Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston on reason as confirmatory of revelation.30 Frazer
compares Witherspoon with the heterodox minister Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), arguing that
since “reason was the source” to understand the “Divine Being” in Witherspoon’s Lectures, it is
“quite similar to that of other rationalists.”31
Another political theorist, Benjamin Lynerd, in his book titled Republican Theology: The
Civil Religion of American Evangelicals, takes aim at Witherspoon, arguing that “traditional
Calvinism” conflicts with the republican principle of public moral virtue that he came to
accept.32 In republican political theory, he writes, “free citizens must be privately virtuous in
order to maintain their republic.”33 But this conflicts with the Calvinist doctrines of sin and
grace. The Fall made man, in the words of Calvin and quoted by Lynerd, “captive by the yoke of
sin.” Only the “gospel of grace” brings about better public behavior. All other “[a]ttempts to
behave better are futile and beside the point: what a sinner needs is restoration with God,
available only through faith in Jesus.”34 The development of a republican theology requires the
Calvinist to compromise his view on the effects of the Fall. For this reason, Calvinism “not only
undermines the project of moral reform, it also undermines republicanism itself.”35 Lynerd
assumes (since he does not provide an analysis of the Reformed tradition) that traditional
Calvinists view sinners as incapable of cherishing and preserving society, producing civil order,

30

Scott, 39. Below I argue that this view, when reason is set within certain bound, is indeed the Reformed
position. Revelation completes and assumes reason.
31
Frazer, 42. Though Frazer does recognize that “Witherspoon, like Priestley and the theistic rationalists,
did see a role for revelation in understanding God.”
32
Benjamin T. Lynerd Republican Theology: The Civil Religion of American Evangelicals (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
33
Ibid, 47.
34
Ibid, 48.
35
Ibid, 50.
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and comprehending the principles of just laws. A republican theology cannot include the
Calvinist doctrine of total depravity.
Lynerd identifies John Witherspoon as a clear unprincipled compromiser. Witherspoon’s
most popular work against the Moderates was the satirical book, Ecclesiastical Characteristics,36
which Lynerd calls an “evangelical manifesto” for its insistence that “Christians cannot confess
faith in the gospel and in the doctrine of moral sense.”37 In the pamphlet, Witherspoon rejects
moral sense philosophy, according to Lynerd, because it requires Calvinists to compromise the
doctrine of moral depravity. Lynerd writes, “Moral sense theory stages too many departures from
the gospel—on the presence of evil in the world, on its dominion over the human heart, and on
the need for divine redemption—for there to be any comfortable degree of compatibility.” 38 In
other words, if one has knowledge of moral truth and can achieve a degree of it apart from
special grace and scriptural revelation, then one cannot be utterly depraved. Since Calvinists
reject the consequent, they must reject the antecedent. This explains, to Lynerd’s mind, why
Witherspoon the uncompromising Calvinist attacked Hutcheson and the Moderates during his
Scotland career.39
Lynerd makes much of the apparent differences between Witherspoon’s Scotland and
American careers, aligning Witherspoon with traditional Calvinism in the former and
compromised Calvinism in the latter. To Lynerd’s mind, the contradictions in his two careers

36

John Witherspoon, The Selected Writings of John Witherspoon, ed. Thomas Miller (Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990).
37
Ibid, 82.
38
Ibid.
39
It is unlikely, however, that Witherspoon held to such a view of depravity; and his “Ecclesiastical
Characteristics” does not argue for such a position. Daniel Howe, rightly states, “Significantly what
Witherspoon most disliked about the Moderates was not their use of reason but their sentimentality and
indulgent attitude toward human emotions and failing.” Daniel W Howe. “John Witherspoon and the
Transatlantic Enlightenment,” in The Atlantic Enlightenment. Edited by Susan Manning and Francis D.
Cogliano. (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 37.
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demonstrate the type of conflict on public morality between Enlightenment thought and
Reformed Orthodoxy that forced upon the orthodox unprincipled compromises necessary for the
acceptance of “republican theology.” Shortly after arriving in America, Witherspoon makes an
apparent shift from criticizing philosophers and minsters such as Hutcheson to appropriating and
teaching their thought in America, perhaps in the interests of adopting “republican theology.” By
doing so, Witherspoon changed his views on reason and philosophy, argues Lynerd. In Lectures,
for example, Witherspoon writes, “the whole of Scripture is perfectly agreeable to sound
philosophy.”40 Lynerd declares this to be nothing less than “strik[ing] a deal with [Francis]
Hutcheson….The compromise goes like this: Witherspoon now accepts the essential capacity of
the human to know the way of virtue.”41 Witherspoon seems to affirm what he spent his early
career in Scotland attacking: He now believes that the accessibility of natural knowledge
concerning civic virtue has not been entirely destroyed by the fall and that man is not devoid of
the light of reason. “Traditional Calvinism,” Lynerd tells us, taught the opposite: man could not
know virtue apart from special grace, let alone have the ability to conduct oneself in accordance
with virtue. Witherspoon compromised his Reformed Orthodoxy.
As with Lynerd, the crucial issue with many scholars is the Reformed doctrine of total
depravity, which precludes, they claim, any trust in reason, even for ethics (let alone a robust
natural theology). Calvinists do not appeal to nature and the created order, for they believe in the
doctrine of natura deleta; that is, nature has been destroyed by man’s fallenness.42 Natural law is
no longer accessible apart from revelation. Man can rely only on special, salvific grace, not
nature to guide his steps. Scott argues that early Calvinism (that is, the Calvinism before it was

40

Witherspoon, Lectures, 65.
Lynerd, 85.
42
See Grabill, 56 for a description and critique of this understanding of Calvinism.
41
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“modified” by the Enlightenment) did not place “confidence…in the reason of man.” He cites
Cotton Mather, a New Light minister, who claimed that moral philosophy reduced “infidelity to a
system.”43 Frazer states that “Witherspoon put great confidence in man’s reason and its power to
understand God. Rather than appealing to Genesis, his argument for the ‘belief of a Divine
being’ is that it was ‘well supported by the clearest reason.’”44 Frazer goes so far to say, though
clearly false, that Witherspoon thought that the “discoveries of reason were infallible.” Since
Witherspoon adopts the approach of Enlightenment thinkers—the use of “conscience enlightened
by reason [and] experience”—he contradicted the alleged Reformed Orthodox position which
rejects the use of reason and appeal to natural law as a means by which one confirms, supports,
or discovers moral truths.
Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphy even think that Witherspoon’s theological
orthodoxy and philosophical approach are so far apart that he, when having his Enlightenment
hat on, denied moral depravity:
The whole argument evidences Witherspoon’s belief in the harmony of the moral order,
God’s will, public interest, and private happiness, as well as in the workings of our
affections and sentiments of approbation to reinforce one another in right decision. Thus
we are not depraved by original sin, but are competent to see and correct our own
departures from original purity, and, by inference, to mold and remake our institutions by
choice.45

A certain harmony in the natural order—the ability for a community and individuals to have
honesty, civility, and correct behavior—indicates that humans have an “original purity.” They
conclude that “there is a question of consistency between [Witherspoon’s] ethical and theological
views.”46

Scott, “Introduction,” 39.
Frazer, 42.
45
Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphy A History of Philosophy in America (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, (1977), 235.
46
Ibid, 234.
43
44
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The Flower and Murphy commentary is just one example of how even the best of
scholars are puzzled by Witherspoon’s seemingly incoherent belief system. Even Noll et al., who
are all conservative Christians, see a “background conflict between conservative theology and
Enlightenment philosophy which the Princeton professor never synthesized…From the very
beginning, he attempted to live in two different, but not unrelated camps: Federal theology and
Enlightenment philosophy.”47 There is an absolute Enlightenment/Calvinist dichotomy presented
in the literature: there is no kind of Venn diagram with overlapping objects of reason between the
Christian and non-Christian. The two are diametrically opposed. Witherspoon had to have,
according to the literature, two conflicting hats, wearing one or the other depending on what role
in which he found himself.
Daniel Howe and John G. West are the only two scholars I have found who have attempted
to resolve the seeming inconsistencies. Howe rightly recognizes that the Genevan Calvinist
theologian Benedict Pictet, whose thought I describe in the next section, had a significant influence
upon Witherspoon. “Pictet emphasized,” Howe writes, “much as Witherspoon did later, the
harmony between reason and revelation.”48 Though I dispute Howe’s reading of Pictet as an early
transitional theologian away from Reformed Orthodoxy, he is correct to link Witherspoon with
Pictet. As I show below, Pictet taught, much like his Reformed predecessors, that there is harmony
and complementarity between reason and revelation, permitting the type of inquiry Witherspoon
conducted in Lectures. West’s chapter on religion and the American Founding in The Politics of
Revelation and Reason is generally consistent with my account.49 He shows that a few of the

47

Noll, et al., 88-89. Quoted in Frazer, 41.
Daniel W Howe. “John Witherspoon and the Transatlantic Enlightenment,” in The Atlantic
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Founders, including James Wilson and John Witherspoon, believed in a “framework” for the
relationship of reason and revelation that “was thoroughly consistent with the historic Christian
conception of natural law”.50 West, however, does not go in any detail on this “historic Christian
conception,” leaving the reader uninformed on whether the Reformed theological tradition is
outside historic Christianity on this matter. I clarify the relationship of the Reformed tradition to
this conception, showing consistency and continuity.
As mentioned above, many scholars think that Witherspoon had a conversion to an
“enlightened orthodoxy” sometime around becoming president of Princeton. Ecclesiastical
Characteristics, in which he sought satirically to “open the mystery of moderation”51 to his
readers, made him quite popular in Scotland, and he became one of the leading clergymen
opposed to the Moderate movement. The Moderates were Scottish clergymen, influenced by
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671 – 1713), who, among other things,
thought that aesthetic education was essential to good morals. Hutcheson followed Shaftesbury’s
thought and systematized it, arguing that aesthetics and morality led them, as Witherspoon
characterized it, to “despise” the “inclinations of the common people.”52 As Thomas Miller
points out, Witherspoon “criticized the aestheticism and moralism of Hutcheson and Shaftesbury
because he saw how it could lead educated leaders in practice to assume that they knew better
than the public.”53 His main accusation was that the Moderates were elitists and used this selfassumed status to justify certain authoritarian practices, such as denying local parishes the right
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to accept or deny ministers. The Moderates were also too accepting of the mechanistic
philosophy of the “infidels.” In Ecclesiastical Characteristics, Witherspoon constructs an
“Athenian Creed,” which attributes to the Moderates the belief that the “universe is a huge
machine, wound up from everlasting by necessity.”54 It is the world of the naturalistic and
mechanistic philosophers, with whom the Moderates had, in the eyes of Witherspoon, a rather
personal, supportive and friendly relationship.
Scholars regularly argue that Witherspoon opposed in Scotland not only the Moderates’
conclusions, but also their approach to moral theory. According to Flower and Murphy, since in
his Lectures “he starts his ethics, not with premises guaranteed by religion or revelation, but from
the construction of human nature as learned by observation,” he converted to the Athenian Creed.55
Indeed, “Witherspoon’s Lectures builds on a naturalistic view of human nature that goes even
further than Hutcheson’s in broadening the natural affections to include religious ones.”56 This
new “attitude toward moral philosophy” is opposed to his previous, more consistently Calvinist,
take on reason and philosophy.57 It is on this point that Frazer calls Witherspoon “philosophically
schizophrenic.”58 And Stephen Marini states that “Witherspoon…was an eclectic Enlightenment
thinker whose Calvinism was less than completely orthodox and whose evangelicalism was not
easy to detect. He insisted on the power of human reason to understand God.”59
But these scholars are mistaken, both for a faulty understanding of Reformed theology,
which I discuss below, and on the facts. As Daniel Howe rightly states, “Significantly what
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Witherspoon most disliked about the Moderates was not their use of reason but their sentimentality
and indulgent attitude toward human emotions and failing.”60 Nowhere in Ecclesiastical
Characteristics does Witherspoon question the use of reason. He questions the Moderate’s idea
(so he alleges) that preaching must primarily use “rational considerations.” But the subject of this
criticism is the sermon, not the civil magistrate’s approach to politics. Witherspoon’s concern is
that by citing “heathen” writers and appealing to reason in sermons preachers would appear as
above their parishioners, the common people. Church ministers are ministers of the Gospel and
servants to all people, the educated and uneducated; and the duties of man in scripture are
discernable to all. Reformed preaching is not a lecture on reason or the pagan classics, but a
declaration of the kingdom of God established in Christ. Witherspoon also thought that these
rational considerations placed too much focus on the “advantages in the present life without any
regard to a future state.”61 The minister should be concerned not only with public virtue, but with
the state and ultimate destination of the individual soul; and the means of saving one’s soul is
adventitious to rational considerations. So there is no indication that Witherspoon denounced the
use of reason or philosophy per se; he criticized the Moderates for their authoritarian and elitist
use of it. They would, according to him, set themselves up as superior and view the uneducated as
“contemptible, vulgar, [and] ignorant.”62 Moreover, as Howe rightly argues, Pictet in Christian
Theology showed Witherspoon that “it was not necessary to adopt the laxity of the Moderates in
order to take account of secular moral philosophy.”63 Having some optimism for philosophical
inquiry does not require moral laxity, elitism, or arrogance in sermons.
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The seeming inconsistency of Witherspoon’s two careers is resolved when we understand
precisely the problem Witherspoon had with the Moderates. There is no evidence that his concern
was with reason and philosophy per se, but with the arrogance and elitism that such inquiry
produced in some ministers in the Church of Scotland; and there is no indication that he believed
that philosophical inquiry must lead to these ministerial character flaws. In the absence of the
Moderates, Witherspoon could put his concerns to the side, permitting him the time to conduct
philosophical inquiries and teach others to do the same. To be sure, none of this proves that
Witherspoon did not at some point have some change of mind on reason and philosophy. I have
simply claimed that the issue in the Moderate controversy was not, for Witherspoon, over reason
and philosophy itself. This leaves open the question of whether Witherspoon “converted” to a more
“enlightened” stance after crossing the Atlantic, but evidence for such a conversion cannot come
from his encounters with the Moderates. And if I am correct that the Reformed tradition permits
philosophical inquiry within certain limits (which Witherspoon did not exceed), then there is no
reason to think that Witherspoon’s trans-atlantic “conversion,” if there was one, was anything but
a shift of context and role. After all, Witherspoon read Pictet in Scotland. It is likely that
Witherspoon’s positions on reason and philosophy remained unchanged throughout his life.
But even if there was a shift in Witherspoon’s views, the Reformed tradition on the matter
of philosophy and confidence in reason is diverse, encompassing both positions. A Reformed
Christian could argue for low confidence or relatively high confidence and remain consistently
Reformed. Too often Reformed theology is presented as a rigidly narrow and unified theological
tradition. It is better to say that there is a theological framework that sets the boundaries of
orthodoxy while permitting all sorts of perspectives on reason and philosophy. In the next section,
I describe this unity of framework and acceptable diversity in degree of confidence.
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CHAPTER 2
REASON AND REVELATION IN THE REFORMED TRADITION
Researchers on Witherspoon’s philosophy have, understandably, focused on the
philosophical sources of Witherspoon’s moral philosophy. That is, they have searched for the
sources of the content of his philosophy. However, scholars have neglected the sources that made
it possible for a Calvinist such as Witherspoon to do philosophy, likely due to the common
assumption that no such sources exist, and hence Witherspoon’s philosophical approach is prima
facie a compromised Calvinism – a type of enlightened Christianity.
This assumption has led interpreters of the American Founding Fathers’ religious beliefs
to persistently fail to make proper distinctions, particularly on matters related to the relationship
of reason and revelation. There is significant misunderstanding of the Reformed theological
tradition and an almost complete neglect in the literature on the post-Reformation theological
development. In the 17th century, there was considerable development by Reformed theologians,
particularly on the place and role of reason, culminating in what theologians call “Reformed
Orthodoxy.”64 It is important to emphasize that “Reformed Orthodoxy” is the culmination of
over 150 years of theological systematization and discourse since the beginning of the
Reformation. It is not Calvin’s theology, though all recognize Calvin as an essential early
Reformed contributor to the development. Reformed Orthodoxy, then, is not whatever one finds
in Calvin’s corpus; it is the accomplishment of many theologians from many parts of Europe. It
is precise and nuanced. And, unfortunately, it is widely unknown or misunderstood.
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Knowledge of this development among political theorists and commentators on religion
and the American founding is no exception.65 There is no discussion on the stages of
development in Reformed Orthodoxy. There is little discussion on the duplex cognitio dei (the
twofold knowledge of God); on the distinctions between God as Creator and God as Redeemer
and between supernatural and natural duties; and on the complementarity of grace and nature in
the Reformed tradition. Rather, what we typically find in much (though not all) of the
scholarship on the Reformed theology’s impact on the Founding is the sole use of John Calvin,
and often poorly, as the chief codifier of the Reformed tradition, and we find the assumption that
the New World Puritans (e.g., Winthrop) were the exemplars of Calvinism.66 The Founding
generation, who appealed to “nature and nature’s God,” is then compared and found to be less
than Reformed. Reformed theology is presented as narrow and rigid, with little room for
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theological diversity and development. At times there is an alarming disinterest among political
theorists to get Reformed theology right—its nuances, diversity, classical and medieval sources,
catholicity, etc.67 This must change. Where do scholars get the idea that appeals to “nature’s
God,” natural theology, natural law, and moral sense, and the use of reason and philosophy
during the Founding era must indicate a rejection of the Reformed tradition, betray an
unprincipled compromise of that tradition, or a move towards a so-called “rationalistic” or
“enlightened” Christianity?
Understanding the unity and diversity of Reformed Orthodoxy precludes the popular
attempts of reducing all or most of the Founders’ religious beliefs to a single monolithic,
simplistic and imprecise label, such as “theistic rationalism,” “rational Christianity,”
“supernatural rationalism,” or “enlightened Christianity.”68 There certainly were Founders to
which those labels apply, but no label can capture the diversity of positions on revelation and
reason in the Founding era, especially since many had views of reason and revelation consistent
with Reformed Orthodoxy. And such generalizations quite often rely on a false and assumed
premise, namely, that any use of reason or appeal to nature’s God is evident of a rejection of
traditional, orthodox Protestantism—an indication, many say, of the triumph of rationalism over
traditional religion.69 But this is all wrong for various reasons, all of which I will discuss.
I present the Reformed Orthodox position on the relationship between reason and
revelation and then highlight the thought of a Reformed theologian, Benedict Pictet, who likely
influenced Witherspoon. I then compare the work of Witherspoon, showing that he was perfectly
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consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy in terms of theological framework. Witherspoon was not a
“rationalist” for appealing to natural law, natural theology, and reason apart from revelation.70 To
be clear, I do not attempt to show that all the content of Witherspoon’s moral philosophy (e.g.,
Scottish realism and common sense philosophy) is consistent with the Reformed tradition. I wish
to show only that Witherspoon’s framework permits the use of reason and philosophical inquiry
conducted in his Lectures.
Before directly discussing Reformed Orthodoxy, it is necessary to discuss Calvin’s
relationship to the post-Reformation era. As mentioned above, it is very common for scholars to
treat Calvin as the sole or chief source of the Reformed tradition. And in the areas of our present
concern—natural law, natural theology and reason—Calvin does not rise to the level of
sophistication found in some of the medieval and later Reformed scholastic systems. After all,
Calvin was never trained as a theologian. Still, he does, as Grabill says, “not deny the formal
possibility of developing subsidiary doctrines of natural theology and natural law on the basis of
God’s reliable but obfuscated natural revelation within creation, design of the human body, and
conscience.”71 Calvin laid the groundwork for further development, and he is not the codifier of
the Reformed position. He is not the final word or chief source for the Reformed view of natural
theology and natural law, and he ought not to be treated as such. Calvinist theology developed
significantly after Calvin. As Richard Muller writes,
The view of the twentieth century, which has selected Calvin as the chief early
codifier, must be set aside, particularly in those instances when the formative
influence toward the development of a specific doctrinal position came not from
Calvin but from one of his contemporaries. Orthodoxy must be understood not as
My argument parallels John G. West’s chapter on “Religion and the American Founding,” in The
Politics of Revelation and Reason (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 11-78. He does not,
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a result of or a defection from the work of a single thinker but as a doctrinal
development resting on a fairly diverse theological heritage.72

It is also important to keep in mind that Calvin made little attempt to systematize his doctrine. He
did not write a systematic theology. Nor did he write in the scholastic method or care to address
in detail many of the controversies and disputes found in medieval scholastics. This came later,
as Muller agues:
Where the Reformers painted with a broad brush, their orthodox and scholastic
successors strove to fill in the details of the picture. Whereas the Reformers were
intent upon distancing themselves and their theology from problematic elements
in medieval thought and, at the same time, remaining catholic in the broadest
sense of that term, the Protestant orthodox were intent upon establishing
systematically the normative, catholic character of institutionalized Protestantism,
at times through the explicit use of those elements in patristic and medieval
theology not at odds with the teachings of the Reformation.73
Scholars on the American founding seem unaware of the development of Calvinism by the later
continental Reformers. They know perhaps Phillipe de Mornay, Samuel Rutherford, and, to a
lesser extent, Theodore Beza and Johannes Althusius, but not the Reformed scholastic
theologians such as Peter Martyr Vermigli, Franciscus Junius, Girolamo Zanchi, Gisbertus
Voetius, Francis Turretin, and Pictet.74 The curriculum in Scotland’s universities at the time of
Witherspoon’s education included works by these Reformed scholastic theologians,75 and
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according to James Moore, Scotland and the rest of Europe were “dominated” by the “cast of
mind” set by Reformed scholasticism.76 Witherspoon was educated amidst this cast of mind.
Further, it is important to note that Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion was not
the principal text of Witherspoon’s education. He most likely studied the work of Francis
Turretin (1623 – 1687), one of the most important theologians of Reformed Orthodoxy, and he
certainly studied the theology of Pictet (the evidence for which I present below), whose CT is
largely a summary of the accomplishments of Turretin. The theology of these two represent the
culmination of Reformed theological systematization, resulting in part a fairly robust and
orthodox natural theology and view of natural law that sees the epistemological consequences of
sin as less drastic than Calvin, though not to an extent that necessitates a departure from Calvin’s
theological framework.77 This theological development has receive no mention, so far as I can
find, in the literature.
In my discussion on Reformed Orthodoxy, I rely heavily (though not exclusively) on
Turretin, a Genevan theologian who has been called the “champion and grandmaster of
Reformed polemics” and whose work is often considered “the apex of the development of
[Reformed] scholastic theology in the post-Reformation era.”78 He was trained in philosophy and
theology at the Academy of Geneva and became one of its professors of theology. He is an
immensely important theologian in the Reformed theological tradition. Here I will quote and cite
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from sections of Turretin’s magnum opus, Institutes of Elenctic Theology (IET),79 a three-volume
work that was a standard theological text in Scotland in the 18th century.
Though there is no direct evidence that I could find indicating that Witherspoon
encountered Turretin’s works, it is highly probable, however, that he studied Turretin’s IET at
some point while he was in Scotland. Universities throughout Scotland taught the work while
Witherspoon was a student and clergyman,80 and Reformed Scholasticism (of which Turretin
was a leading figure) was established in Scotland universities at the end of the 17th century and
its dominance continued through the 18th century.81 In Witherspoon’s satirical work,
Ecclesiastical Characteristics, he mentions Pictet and Turretin as having “antiquated systems of
divinity.”82 The book being satirical, Witherspoon is actually showing his praise for them,
suggesting both that he respected Turretin and Pictet and that they were well-known and
important in Scotland at the time.

I.

Reason and Revelation in Post-Reformation Orthodoxy
The theologians who contributed to the 17th century development of Reformed theology,

often called “Reformed scholastics,” subscribed to a rigorous and precise methodology for the
formulation and codification of theological doctrine.83 The purpose of Reformed scholasticism
was to deal with problems and objections to Reformed theology and to achieve a degree of
‘catholicity’ by bringing Reformed theology into the broader theological discussion from the
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patristics to the present. The post-Reformation theologians faced different opponents than their
theological forefathers. Descartes, Spinoza, the Socinians, deists, and others challenged
foundational principles of faith through the exaltation of reason beyond what even medieval
schoolmen would have accepted. In response, the post-reformation theologians formulated and
systematized with precision the relationship of reason to revelation. Their answer was, with
minor variation between them, that reason is ancillary, confirmatory, and supportive of special
revelation. Faith does not destroy reason, nor does grace destroy nature. Faith completes reason
and grace completes nature. There is harmony, complementarity and mutual subordination. The
post-Reformation theologians clearly acknowledged the legitimacy of reason, natural law,
natural theology, and philosophy. Indeed, it is difficult to find a Reformed theologian during this
period who declared reason apart from revelation to be useless or necessarily dangerous, natural
law and natural theology to be inaccessible or abrogated by special revelation, or philosophy to
be nothing but a pagan enterprise. Instead, we find highly nuanced and positive accounts of all of
these.84
These theologians affirmed, with Calvin, that natural reason apart from special revelation
was sufficient, prior to the Fall of Adam, for man to achieve righteousness before God. Reason,
not special revelation, was the original means by which man would acquire moral, creational
truths. God related to man solely as Creator, not additionally as Redeemer; and the Creator
established at creation the standard of righteousness—the natural law.85 As Francis Turretin,
wrote, “There is a natural law, not arising from a voluntary contract or law of society, but from a
divine obligation being impressed by God upon the conscience of man in his very creation....[S]o
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many evidences of this are still left in our [fallen] nature…that there is no mortal who cannot feel
its force either more or less.”86 And the law of God is natural and immutable, since “it must be
drawn from the right of nature itself, founded both on the nature of God, the Creator.”87
The Fall of Adam diminished (though did not obliterate) man’s ability to reason properly,
leaving no hope for achieving righteousness and eternal life. But though God created no remedy
for sin in the created order, God chose both to republish the standard of righteousness in the
Mosaic Law (called here the “moral law” or “revealed law”) and to reveal himself as the
Redeemer in the person and work of Christ. This is the “twofold knowledge” of God—the duplex
cognitio dei: God revealed as both Creator and as Redeemer.88 The former is creational
knowledge and the latter is knowledge adventitious to creation. And the moral law in the Bible
“supposes the general knowledge of nature.”89 It is the same in substance as the natural, only it is
delivered through a different and perspicuous mode, namely, inscripturation.90 As Turretin
writes, “it is not repugnant that one and same thing in a different relation should both be known
by the light of nature and believed by the light of faith; as what is gathered from the one only
obscurely, may be held more certainly from the other. Thus we know that God is, both from
nature and from faith.”91 The law of God is known in two ways: 1) from the natural law by
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reason and 2) from scripture by faith. Faith and reason are two means by which one can know
the same God as Creator and his demands.
Knowledge of God as Redeemer, however, is much different. Knowledge of redemption,
grace, the Trinity, incarnation, etc. are further, added knowledge that are above reason; and, as
above reason, such knowledge is accessible through Scripture alone. Turretin writes, “The
mysteries of faith are beyond the sphere of reason to which the unregenerate man cannot rise.”92
Since this added knowledge is above reason, it follows that reason has limitations. Reason has its
own set of objects—natural objects revealed by God as Creator and therefore “reason cannot and
should not draw mysteries from its own treasury.”93 Those doctrines revealed supernaturally,
such as the doctrines of the Trinity and incarnation, are above reason and therefore inaccessible
by it. Reason has a limited “storehouse”94 of truths that is not exhaustive of all truth.
Still, the added revelation of God as Redeemer does not abrogate natural truths. Grace does not
supersede or replace nature. Grace completes, complements, and perfects nature. For “light [does
not] oppose light, nor truth oppose truth because God is the author of both.”95 Natural and special
revelation are coherent: although the knowledge of God the Redeemer is adventitious to nature
and above reason, such special knowledge does not violate the first principles of reason, such as
the law of non-contradiction. Put differently, no proposed supernatural truth can violate the
basic principles of reason, but the doctrine itself need not be comprehended by reason, nor
discoverable by reason alone. Turretin distinguishes between an “incomprehensible” thing
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(which cannot be grasped)… [because] we have only an obscure and imperfect knowledge of
them” and an “incompossible thing (which cannot be conceived).”96 Hence, the first principles of
reason are also principles in revelation: “For although we do not deny that the mysteries of faith
are above reason, still we do not think that they are contrary to it; so that if their truth cannot be
proved from reason, still their credibility may be sufficiently established by faith.”97 The doctrine
of the Trinity, for example, is obscure (and therefore incomprehensible), yet not impossible,
according to Turretin. Still, no proposed mystery of faith can contradict the first principles of
reason. Otherwise, faith destroys reason; grace destroys nature. Turretin concludes, then, that
“Reason is perfected by faith and faith supposes reason, upon which to found the mysteries of
grace.”98
The Reformed Scholastics, far from declaring philosophy to be merely a pagan
enterprise, affirmed its use. The clearest praise for philosophy comes from the highly influential
16th century Reformed theologian Zacharias Ursinus:
True philosophy, although it also differs very much from the doctrine of the
church, yet, it does not array itself against it, nor is it a wicked fabrication, and
device of Satan, as is true of the false doctrines of the Sects; but it contains truth,
and is, as it were, a certain ray of the wisdom of God, impressed upon the mind of
man in his creation. It is a doctrine that has respect to God and his creatures, and
many other things that are good and profitable to mankind, and has been drawn
out from the light of nature, and from principles in themselves clear and evident,
and reduced to a system by wise and earnest men. It follows, therefore, that it is
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not only lawful, but also profitable, for Christians to devote themselves to the
study of philosophy.99
And 16th century Reformed theologian, Peter Martyr Vermigli, in his commentary on
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, wrote,
Since true philosophy derives from the knowledge of created things, and from
these propositions reaches many conclusions about the justice and righteousness
that God implanted naturally in human minds, it cannot therefore rightly be
criticized: it is the work of God and could not be enjoyed by us without his special
contribution.100
In Turretin’s discussion on philosophy, he affirms its use and devotes most of his
argument to keeping philosophy within its proper bounds. Though God is the “author of
philosophy and of natural reason,” this does not means that “these should be the interpreters of
Scripture.”101 Philosophy is useful in “convincing the Gentiles,” testifying to the “consent in
things known by nature, by which (as from a twofold revelation) the truth and certainly of the
things themselves may be better confirmed,” and preparing the “reception” of heavenly doctrine.
Turretin even permits “the philosopher…to begin with a doubt in order to [conduct] a safer
investigation of natural things.”102 His greatest concern is not with philosophizing but that
“care…[is] taken that philosophical truths be not extended beyond their own sphere and ordinary
powers of nature.”103 Reason and philosophy must stay within its limits, functioning as
“servants” in relation to mysteries of faith. This function of reason is not rationalistic, as Muller
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writes, "The Protestant attempt to argue the ancillary status of reason ought no more to be called
rationalism than the medieval attempt."104
It is crucial to recognize that the insistence on the ancillary, supportive and confirmatory
status of reason was primarily to safeguard the mysteries, not natural knowledge. They wanted a
reason/revelation schema that did not bring doctrines such as the Trinity under the measure of
reason, while at the same time insisting that the schema not reject, destroy, or undermine reason,
especially in relation to natural duty. There was much less concern over reason’s ability to make
proper conclusions on one’s duties to fellow man, which explains why there was much
commentary and praise of works on ethics by pagans, such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca.105
Indeed, many Reformed theologians in this period even acknowledged the virtue of
pagans and their ability to know the natural law as it relates to human social relations—even to
the point of acknowledging a sort of natural sociability. Reformed theologians “have always
fully acknowledged,” writes 19th century Dutch theologian Herman Bavinck,
the existence and moral value of [the virtue of pagans.] Since after the fall people
have remained human and continue to share in the blessings of God's common
grace, they can inwardly possess many virtues and outwardly do many good
deeds that, viewed through human eyes and measured by human standards, are
greatly to be appreciated and of great value for human life. But this is not to say
that they are good in the eyes of God and correspond to the full spiritual sense of
his holy law.106
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Calvin affirms a distinction between “earthly” objects (“matters of policy and economy, all
mechanical arts, and liberal studies”) and “heavenly” objects (“true righteousness and future
blessedness”), and when man is focused on the former he can achieve “some result,” proving that
“some principle of civil order is impressed on all. And this is ample proof that…no man is
devoid of the light of reason.”107 Though man “lost all understanding”108 on matters related to
heaven,109 not all was lost on earthly matters. Man can still be “very acute and sagacious” on
earthly matters, but not on heavenly matters.110 Man’s “supernatural” virtues—those which relate
to heaven and the eschaton, such as “the light of faith and righteousness”—were “withdrawn,”
but the natural gifts were only “corrupted,” ensuring that there is still “civil order impressed on
all.”111 Hence, within the Reformed framework there is potential great optimism concerning
man’s ability to reach sound conclusions on natural duties. This is why the Reformed political
theorist, Johannes Althusius can consistently state, “But in political life even an infidel may be
called just, innocent, and upright.”112 Turretin argues for the existence of the natural law by
citing the “consent of the nations, among whom…”
some law of the primitive nations obtains, from which even without a teacher they
have learned that God should be worshipped, parents honored, a virtuous life be
led and from which as a fountain have flowed so many laws concerning equity
and virtue enacted by heathen legislators, drawn from nature itself. And if certain
laws are found among some repugnant to these principles, they were even with
reluctance received and observed by a few, at length abrogated by contrary laws,
and have fallen into desuetude.113
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When Reformed theologians attack the “frigid speculation” of the medieval philosophers, it was
not typically for their conclusions on natural duty, but for their extending reason beyond its
bounds—their philosophizing about the divine essence, for example.114
In summary, the Reformed theological framework of reason and revelation supports and
encourages the use of philosophy; has a positive account of the place and role of reason in
theological matters; and affirms a universal natural law that remains accessible to all (including
the unregenerate) apart from scripture and a relatively positive account of man’s ability to make
sound judgments on natural duties.
It is important to notice that in Reformed theology a redeemed man remains a man—a
man obligated to fulfill the demands of God his Creator. Natural law and natural theology, then,
remain part of man’s obligations to God and fellow man. Grace has not replaced nature. The
moral law in scripture has not replaced the natural law. The Christian remains just as human as
before conversion (and perhaps more so). Furthermore, the post-Reformation theologians
believed that natural revelation was extensive, covering far more than man’s duties to man, but
also the divine attributes of God and vague principles of worship. The former duties include civil
government and the latter a type of natural theology and natural religion. These are universal
truths, not exclusive truths for the elect. And these universal truths are evident from “universal
experience,” “consent of the nations,” and “heathen philosophers.”115 For there remains “small
light…in things civil and natural.”116 Hence, the use of reason apart from revelation for inquiry
into natural duties, natural rights, principles of governance, the development of constitutions, the
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relationship of natural religion to civic morality, and all sorts of questions relating to “earthly
matters” is perfectly acceptable in Reformed Orthodoxy.
Since the objects of reason are natural objects – that is, universal truths common to all—
one can legitimately and productively deliberate and reason with others who have unorthodox
views of revelation or who reject revelation entirely. There is a type of Venn diagram in which
there is an overlap on agreed objects of reason, namely, on matters pertaining to ethics and
political philosophy (i.e., earthly maters and natural duties). For example, both Reformed
Christians and Unitarians of the Founding era could cooperate on certain moral and political
matters, since they had overlapping objects of reason.
Moreover, this framework does not in principle preclude many of the conclusions of
Enlightenment philosophy, such as Locke’s view of religious tolerance, natural equality, and the
social contract;117 Hutcheson’s philosophy of moral sense; and the conclusion of the
contemporary natural theology (such as Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler).118 The framework of
Reformed Orthodoxy establishes the limits of reason, but it does not itself determine the
necessary content of the conclusions of reason. It permits rational inquiry, but it does not
prescribe the result of the inquiry. It is not enough, then, to simply find, for example, Lockean
notions of liberty and equality and praise for contemporary natural theologians among the
Founders and, on that basis alone, conclude that the otherwise orthodox Founders have
undermined or abandoned their Reformed tradition on reason and revelation.
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II.

Benedict Pictet
Benedict Pictet was Turretin’s nephew and studied theology and philosophy under him.

He was also Turretin’s assistant in the theology department of the Academy of Geneva and later
replaced Turretin as the chair of theology. His most important work, Christian Theology (CT)
was a standard theological text used throughout Scotland in the 18th century. Witherspoon
studied Pictet as a student and, according to Howe, he “cherished” his French copy of CT,119
maintaining a copy in his library at Princeton120 and recommending it to his divinity students at
Princeton.121 The work is largely a summary, with some additions, of Turrtin’s IET.122
Pictet begins chapter II of CT with a discussion on a “system of natural theology.”
Humankind can construct such theology because “we can, by the power of nature, know God,
and that God himself is the author of this knowledge, both by the notion of himself which he has
engraven on the minds of all men, and by the excellent works he has done.”123 Pictet lists four
purposes for natural theology. First, it instructs man that he “might render unto [God], when
known, the tribute of love, praise, and thanksgiving, worship and obedience.”124 God required
humankind to obey the “covenant of nature,” which was “founded on the nature of man.”125
Second, natural theology forms a “bond of society, and prevents men from becoming a prey to
each other.”126 From natural theology pagans form natural religion, which, however useless it is
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for proper and acceptable worship, is useful in ensuring civil peace. Third, natural theology, in
its inadequacy due to the fall, points to the need for a “clearer revelation.” It is preparatory for
the special revelation of the natural knowledge of God, obscured by the fall, and the knowledge
of God as Redeemer, adventitious to nature. The inadequacies of natural theology point to a need
for completeness, which only knowledge of God the Redeemer could satisfy. Finally, natural
theology is “sufficient to leave every one, who abuses his natural light, without any excuse.”
Pictet continues by listing “how much knowledge the Gentiles were able to derive from
the dictates of reason, and from the works of creation and providence.”127 They can know that
God exists; is one, eternal, incorruptible, superior to humans, happy, just, good, powerful, allwise, to be worshiped and praised, and the creator of the world; and governs the world by
providence. They know that God demands that we follow the Golden Rule and that “rectitude
and honesty are to be practiced, parents are honored.” Finally, they know of “the immortality of
the soul, [and] that men ought to “to endeavor to propitiate God’s favour,” and that there is a
judgment to come.
The pagans also sensed that they needed supernatural revelation to know how to conduct
proper worship. This explains why they “found it necessary to pretend that they had conferences
with divinities.”128 They were all “persuaded” that the “right mode of worshipping the Deity
must be drawn from a revelation of him,” for their natural knowledge proved insufficient to
“comfort the human mind against the fear of death” and they could not determine through nature
the proper means of satisfying the wrath and justice of God. He concludes, “A second revelation,
therefore, was necessary, in which God might not only cause to be known, in a clearer manner,
his own perfection, which he had revealed in the first [i.e., natural knowledge], but also discover
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new perfections, and especially reveal ‘the mystery of godliness’”.129 The “new perfections” do
not abrogate the previous or supersede them; they add to and perfect them. The new perfections
(e.g., the Trinity, incarnation, etc.) presuppose the old perfections. For this reason, Pictet says,
“although the two systems differ from each other in the mode of revelation, in the number of
things revealed, in their perspicuity and effects, yet they are in strict harmony, and render each
other mutual service.”130 Pictet, consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy, has affirmed that reason
and revelation have a harmonious and complementary relationship. Revelation completes and
perfects reason. The knowledge of God the Redeemer completes and presupposes the knowledge
of God the Creator.
Contrary to the Socinians, the deists and, later, the Unitarians and in agreement with
Calvin and Turretin, Pictet did not consider natural religion to be sufficient for salvation. He
writes in his work Traite contre l’indifference,
There are among those indifferent individuals, those who believe that it is
sufficient to receive natural religion and thus all those who receive it are agreeable to
God….I admit to our indifferent individuals that natural religion is a divine religion. All
the light that we have proceeds from the father of lights; but I deny that it is sufficient to
receive natural religion because God has revealed to us his will more clearly in the Holy
Scriptures. If God had not revealed himself to us other than by his works of nature, and
by his providence, or by the light that he has given us, then one would have to admit the
truth of natural religion….If it is true that this Scripture is divine, as we believe, we
should be persuaded that one must know these things in order to be saved. But natural
religion does not at all teach us these truths.131

There is no evidence that Witherspoon encountered this book, but it does give us some
indication of Pictet’s Reformed Orthodoxy. Notice that Pictet considers natural religion or, as he
calls it in CT, a system of natural theology, to be legitimate religion. Natural religion apart from
special revelation is potentially legitimate religion, but since God gave additional revelation in
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scripture, it is no longer sufficient for salvation. Pictet has recognized 1) that natural religion is
divine religion (i.e., natural religion’s God is God the Creator and the same God that later and
further revealed himself as Redeemer),132 2) the original sufficiency of natural revelation for
true religion, 3) that scripture contains knowledge that is both adventitious to nature and
necessary for salvation, and 4) that natural religion is not abrogated, but made complete in
revelation (i.e., one must believe and worship God in Christ in order to have true, complete and
perfect religion).
In his discussion on the law of God, Pictet affirms in CT, in language reminiscent of
Calvin and Turretin, that “the moral law is founded, at least in a very great measure, on the
natural right of God; by which we mean that which rests upon the most pure and holy nature of
God himself.” The law is “founded on the very nature of things.”133 For this reason, sound reason
would discover them. The moral law revealed in scripture is the same in substance as the natural
law. They are different modes of revelation, and do not conflict in their content.
The most important section in Pictet for our purposes is his section on the relationship of
faith and reason. He begins by stating the basic Reformed doctrine of sola scriptura: scripture is
the “true and only rule of faith and practice” (58) and there cannot be another. Reason, then,
cannot be a rule of faith and practice. A rule is the “standard by which [one] measures the objects
proposed” (59). Reason cannot be a rule or the mysteries because the “the mysteries of faith are
beyond its sphere” and “cannot comprehend them.” Reason is not suitable to analyze the
mysteries of faith (e.g., the Trinity, the incarnation, predestination, etc.) and cannot serve as the
standard by which one judges them. Despite this seeming dismissal of reason, Pictet affirms that
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“reason has many uses.” It can vindicate the truth against those who “deny revelation
altogether….to convince men and to prepare their minds” to receive the Gospel. Reason is also
useful as an instrument in examining the objects of faith in scripture, but “it is not the rule itself
of these objects of faith.”134
Pictet provides the limitations of reason, using language that seems to be paraphrasing
Turretin’s discussion in IET 1.9.6. First, “Reason cannot and ought not to bring forth any
mysteries, as it were, out of its own storehouse; for this is the prerogative of scripture only” (59).
Reason is neither a rule nor a source for the mysteries of faith. Second, one should not listen to
the complaints of reason for “its incapacities to comprehend the mysteries of faith.” It is to
“offend against reason” to “reject a mystery because it is incomprehensible” (59-60).
Furthermore, consistent with Turretin, Pictet affirms that “reason and faith, though of a
different nature, are not opposed to each other” (59) and that “there is a wonderful harmony
between sound philosophy and divinity; for truth is not contrary to truth, nor light to light.”135 He
cites the “heathens, and not without just grounds” because it shows “how consistent reason itself
is with holy scripture.”136 Given our discussion on the Reformed tradition, this is basic Reformed
doctrine.137 Special revelation adds, for the most part, only mysteries and the means of
redemption to the natural knowledge of God. Scripture does not replace, supersede, or abrogate
natural knowledge. Scripture presupposes it and completes it.
Pictet also writes, “we maintain that we must not admit any thing, even in religious
matters, which is contrary to right reason. For although there is much darkness in the human
mind, yet no one can deny that there remain some sparks of natural light, and that the mind has
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in it those principles of undoubted truth.” To understand this passage, we should keep in mind 1)
that Pictet claimed in the preface that he is largely summarizing Turretin’s much more rigorous
work and 2) that he has already said that reason is not the standard or rule of the objects of faith.
Pictet likely has in mind Turretin’s phrase, “faith supposes reason.” All propositions concerning
“religious matters” cannot violate “those principles of undoubted truth” – the first principles of
reason, such as the law of non-contradiction. Supernatural truth presupposes and is consistent
with natural reason, though natural reason is the not the source for supernatural truth.
Concerning philosophy, Pictet states that it is useful and permitted, “provided it assume
not to itself the power of dictating in article of divinity.”138 For “although here is much darkness
in the human mind, yet no one can deny that there remain some sparks of natural light.”139 The
fall had serious epistemological consequences; and though God still speaks in nature as much as
before the fall, man’s capacity to ‘hear’ it clearly has diminished. Still, reason has not been
obliterated.
As with Turretin and the Reformed Orthodox theologians in general, the chief concern of
Pictet was to safeguard the mysteries of faith from the rule of reason. Unaided and unregenerate
reason with regard to natural objects had decent results among pagans. He states that “many
excellent things, indeed, are recorded of the heathen,” such as that of Socrates, Aristides, Cato,
and “many others.”140 These “splendid actions,” however, are nothing but “virtues of glass,”
because “their aim was not to please God.”141 Still, the actions were good by external standards
and proceeded from a true knowledge of natural duties. And Pictet, with the Reformed tradition,
is far from denouncing the “virtues of glass” as no better than the external evil of others. He
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writes, “We are far, however, from confounding the continence of Scipio with the monstrous
depravity of Nero, or from confounding Fabricius with Catiline, not because the one was good,
but less bad than the other, as Augustine observes.”142
We conclude that for the Pictet, with regard to the external, civil realm pagans can both
regulate their own lives and their society in accordance with natural duties and even have a
somewhat true, though ineffectual, natural religion. Neither are ultimately good in the eyes of
God, but they are civilly good. This is not rationalism, for Pictet is not denying the necessity of
supernatural truth for salvation, nor is he bringing supernatural truth under the standards of
reason. He is simply following the nuance and distinctions found in the Reformed theological
tradition. Due to the distinctions between natural and supernatural truths and God as Creator and
as Redeemer there can be civilly virtuous pagans, yet none that are righteous by the standards of
heaven.
In conclusion, I summarize the main points. (1) Pictet is consistent with Reformed
Orthodoxy and even borrowed heavily from its chief systematician, namely, Turretin. (2) He
affirms natural theology and has a fairly standard list of true knowledge possessed by pagans. (3)
There is nothing improper with philosophical inquiry itself, but it must be kept within the proper
bounds. (4) Reason and philosophy are useful to vindicate truth, to convince non-Christians and
to prepare them for faith. (5) Reason and revelation have a harmonious relationship. Divine
mysteries do not originate from reason, but cannot contradict reason. Hence, revelation
completes, perfects, presupposes, and complements reason. (6) Pagans can be virtuous in an
external and civil sense.
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In light of this discussion on Reformed Orthodoxy and Pictet’s contribution and
representation of it, we are prepared to discuss Witherspoon’s view of reason and revelation. As
we will see, Witherspoon does not deviate from Pictet, which questions the popular belief that he
held to a type of enlightened Christian rationalism.
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CHAPTER 3
WITHERSPOON ON REASON AND REVELATION
An examination of Witherspoon’s thought in light of Reformed Orthodoxy reveals that
Witherspoon has remarkable consistency in his formulation of the relationship of reason and
revelation. His consistency directly contradicts Scott’s claims that “the Calvinism of
Witherspoon is not the Calvinism of Geneva.”143 There is, in fact, no conflict between
Witherspoon’s Calvinism and the Calvinist tradition, at least not in his use of reason and
philosophy, his appeal to natural law, and his construction of a natural theology. To be sure, my
argument is not that everything in Witherspoon’s philosophy, in particular his conclusions from
his philosophical inquiry, is consistent with traditional Reformed political theology and
Reformed theological ethics. My argument is that his framework for inquiry is consistent. Most
of Witherspoon’s conclusions, I would argue, find advocates in the Reformed theological
tradition (such his position on natural equality and moral sense), but I do not attempt to show that
here.
Though Witherspoon’s Lectures on Divinity contains some helpful comments on our
topic, only in Lectures does Witherspoon go into any systematic detail on natural theology, the
relationship of reason and revelation, ethics, and politics. Lectures, unfortunately, was
haphazardly composed and Witherspoon never intended to publish it. Indeed, he went to great
lengths trying to prevent its publishing.144 Still, it is an important work not only for ours
purposes, but also for the study of the Founding era and beyond. Versions of it traveled
throughout the United States, and colleges throughout the country used it for their lectures on
philosophy. Witherspoon was one of the few academics who had done an extensive study of the

143
144

Scott, “Introduction,” Lectures, 38-39.
See Ibid, 29.

43

18th century moral theorists, such as Shaftsbury, Hutcheson, Reid, Hume, Clarke and others.
Some historians credit these lectures as being the means by which moral sense and common
sense theories spread throughout the United States.145 The lectures also established the legacy of
Princeton, which continued to teach moral sense philosophy well into the 19th century, including
at the seminary.146
It is clear, then, that understanding the relationship of the Lectures to Reformed
Orthodoxy is crucial to the study of religion and America from the Founding through the 19th
century. Did Witherspoon via his Lectures spread a framework for the relationship of reason to
revelation that contradicts Reformed Protestant Orthodoxy?

I.

Reason and Revelation
Witherspoon begins his Lectures with a standard definition of moral philosophy: “it is an

inquiry into the nature and grounds of moral obligation by reason, as distinct from revelation.”147
He then immediately mentions two common objections to this type of inquiry in New England at
the time: “Is it safe or useful to separate moral philosophy from religion? It will be said it is
either the same or different from revealed truth; if the same, unnecessary—if different, false and
dangerous.”148 These are two different and mutually exclusive objections. The first objection is
that scriptural revelation and the ethics contained therein contradict, abrogate, or supersede
natural law. Hence, the question is: Why appeal to nature when it is no longer the reference for
moral truth? The norms of creation, one could say, are part of the old dispensation, a time before
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true righteousness was revealed in Christ. Appealing to nature apart from revelation is not only
unreliable but must produce error, even with sound reason. The second objection while assuming
a harmony between reason and revelation, still questions the use of appealing to nature when
scripture, which contains the moral law, already has made natural duties clear. Why risk
producing error when we know reason to be often unreliable and already have our natural duties
republished perspicuously for us in scripture.
Witherspoon attributes the first objection to “an author of New England,”149 likely Cotton
Mather, whom Witherspoon identifies as having claimed that moral philosophy “reduces
infidelity to a system.”150 Witherspoon responds: “If the Scripture is true, the discoveries of
reason cannot be contrary to it; and therefore, it has nothing to fear from that quarter.” We saw
similar statements in our discussion of Reformed Orthodoxy. Witherspoon, with the Reformed
tradition, holds that reason and revelation are harmonious and complementary, and there is a
unity of knowledge in the twofold revelation of God as Creator and God as Redeemer. Hence,
sound reason cannot contradict revelation. Implied here as well is the position that scripture, as a
direct revelation concerning natural duties, is superior in perspicuity than natural law. Revelation
has nothing to fear from (sound) reason, because any knowledge accessible by reason is part of
the unified knowledge disclosed by God. The set of truths discoverable by reason do not and,
indeed, cannot contradict the set of truths of special revelation. Any conclusion from reason that
contradicts scripture cannot be a sound conclusion. Scripture is the principal source of
knowledge of duties; reason is ancillary or supportive. Witherspoon is clearly not suggesting that
human reason is infallible, as Frazer argues.151 Indeed, Witherspoon later mentions the

Scott identifies this “author” as Mather, though others say it is Jonathan Edwards. See Scott, Lectures,
68n1.
150
Witherspoon, Lectures, 64.
151
Frazer, 42.
149

45

“corruption of our nature” as it relates to our ability to reason properly. Human reasoning is
“difficult” due to depravity, and we must “with our remaining power of natural
conscience…endeavor to detect and oppose” errors.152
Witherspoon continues by arguing that “as we are certain it [i.e., reason] can do no evil,
so there is a probability that it may do much good.” (154). In other words, when we understand
the relationship of reason and revelation—the latter, as a direct revelation, being superior in
perspicuity than the former—then reason in principle can do no evil. For since sound reason
cannot be contrary to scripture (because of a unity of knowledge in reason and revelation), sound
reason cannot destroy (that is, can “do no evil” to) special revelation. And since sound reason
cannot destroy revelation, it can only be either useless (as the second objection suggests) or “do
much good.” So Witherspoon has dismissed the first objection, namely, that sound reason
contradicts revelation.
What remains is to answer the second objection, which essentially asks: why gather
moral truth from nature when God’s law, which admittedly is the same in substance with nature,
is already sufficiently revealed in revelation? It is a fair question, given this view of scripture as
sufficient. Witherspoon responds as Turretin and Pictet responded. He writes, “There may be an
illustration and confirmation of the inspired writings, from reason and observation, which will
greatly add to their beauty and force.”153 Remember that Pictet said that reason is useful in
“illustrating” revealed truth “to those who deny revelation altogether”154 and Turretin said that
philosophy can “confirm” the unity of the twofold revelation. Both argued that though God is
clearly revealed in scripture, reason shows a certain unity of knowledge. Reason confirms the
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Christian narrative of the unity of truth: God the Creator, whom one could know fully through
uncorrupted reason, has further revealed himself fully in his word. The purpose of Christian
philosophical inquiry, Witherspoon argues, is to add “beauty and force” to special revelation. His
project is supportive and confirmatory of scripture. In this sense, reason is ancillary to
revelation. In his Lectures on Divinity, he similarly writes, “Moral philosophy….[is a] good
handmaid to the Christian morality.”155 Reason is not the epistemological foundation for special
revelation. Witherspoon’s point is that confirming the coherence of the twofold self-disclosure of
God is a good apologetic for the Christian faith. It reveals the beauty of the Christian
understanding of the world, human nature, history, and truth. This apologetic gives a robust,
comprehensive, and coherent account of the world.
Moreover, reason is useful, according to Witherspoon, to show the fallacious principles
of infidels. Nothing, he writes, “serves more for the support of religion than to see from the
different and opposite systems of philosophers that there is nothing certain in their schemes but
what is coincident with the word of God.”156 We should meet infidels “on their own ground.”
Sound reason demonstrates to infidels that revelation is remarkably consistent with nature. This
would, as Pictet said, show a “wonderful harmony” between reason and revelation to “convince”
and “prepare” them for the Christian faith. As we saw in our discussion on the Reformed
tradition, there is nothing inconsistent with meeting non-Christians “on their own ground” of
reason apart from revelation. All humans qua humans, as a unified race from Adam, are on
common ground. Furthermore, sound reason does nothing but confirm the scriptural narrative
concerning the unity of truth in the twofold revelation of God. Only faulty reason conflicts with
scripture. If a conclusion from reason contradicts scripture, then one’s reasoning is unsound, not
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scripture. As he says in the final lecture, “nothing is certain or valuable in moral philosophy but
what is perfectly coincident with scripture.”157 Scripture is the principal of knowledge on duty,
not reason. And there is no tension between true reason and revelation. The fact that infidels, as
Witherspoon said, “commonly proceed upon pretended principles of reason” gives no
justification for the rejection of reason.
Witherspoon continues: “I am of the opinion that the whole Scripture is perfectly
agreeable to sound philosophy; yet certain it was never intended to teach us everything.” He does
not say here that all the truths of scripture are comprehensible by reason, but that there is nothing
in scripture that contradicts sound reason (i.e., there is nothing “incompossible,” as Turretin
stated). Nothing in scripture violates the first principles of reason. Truth does not oppose truth;
light does not oppose light.158 Witherspoon’s comment that scripture “was never intended to
teach us everything,” for which he provides no elaboration, could simply mean that scripture
contains all the principles of morality, though not all particulars. Or he could mean, as Pictet
wrote, that scripture was not intended “to make us philosophers, mathematicians, or
physicians.”159 I suspect that he intended this latter meaning, but either way Witherspoon is still
within the Reformed tradition. The concern of Reformed Orthodoxy is that scripture exclusively
and sufficiently contains supernatural truth and duties (e.g., the means to salvation, adventitious
to nature), not all particular natural duties and the determinations derived therefrom.
Contrary to most commentators, Witherspoon has presented the basic Reformed
Orthodox position on reason and revelation. He has not drifted to an “Enlightenment”
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framework, nor has he conceded ground to the “theistic rationalists” of Frazer’s analysis. To be
sure, he has a somewhat optimistic view of man’s ability to come to sound conclusions through
reason, but this is not outside the bounds of Reformed Orthodoxy. He clearly affirms that
scripture is infallible, and that reason is not. And he affirms that through careful reasoning one
can support and confirm the natural law republished in scripture, adding to its beauty and force.
His philosophical inquiry is not an attempt to rationalize Christian truth or to show true religion
to be nothing but natural religion. It was an attempt to confirm the general knowledge of God the
Creator and his law found in scripture and thereby demonstrate the beauty found in the
coherence of reason and revelation. For Witherspoon, philosophical inquiry is a type of
apologetic, one that is consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy.160

II.

Limits of Reason
The lectures contain an extensive natural theology and principles of naturel law. By

reason alone, he argues, one could know that God exists; is one, wise, just, good, true, perfectly
moral, spiritual, immense, powerful, perfect, and holy; has majesty, greatness and a perfect
intellect; is the creator, preserver, righteous governor, benefactor, and supreme judge; rewards
and punishes; and is merciful. In Lectures 8 and 9, Witherspoon discusses man’s “external”
duties to God and to fellow men known by reason. These duties include an obligation to worship
God, pray, love, fear, esteem, and honor him. Duties to fellow man are extensive: love, wishing
good to body and soul, justice, parental authority, private property, charity, compassion,
beneficence, public affection, instructing children in religion, sobriety, industry, marriage and
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public spirit. All of this, Witherspoon says, man can know by natural reason. Though extensive,
there is nothing in this list that Reformed Orthodox theologians did not themselves affirm.
Witherspoon discusses the limits of reason in natural theology only once and indirectly,
but his comments are enough to secure him firmly in the Reformed tradition. The possibility of
knowledge of God’s mercy apart from revelation is disputed, he claims; and arguments for such
knowledge are both “vague and general.”161 He concludes that although one can know many
other attributes of God with more confidence apart from revelation, “mercy can be learned from
Revelation only.”162 In his Lectures on Divinity, he similarly writes, “Benignity and goodness to
the innocent is a part of the character of the Deity in natural religion, but mercy to the guilty
belongs wholly to revelation.”163 One can know God’s mercy only by an additional revelation of
God as Redeemer, and even the classical pagan philosophers “acknowledged” this necessity “in
their writings."164 The concern to set the limits of reason as falling short of knowledge of divine
mercy is indicative of the type of theological caution one would expect from an orthodox
theologian. Witherspoon has affirmed both that there are truths above reason (though not
contradictory to reason) and that such truths are exclusively contained in scripture. Witherspoon
recognized the proper distinction between reason and revelation, nature and grace, and
philosophy and theology.

III.

Civil Society and Natural Religion
Witherspoon also recognizes the natural sociability of man and the usefulness of religion

in the maintenance of civil order, both of which might seem to contradict the traditional account
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of man’s depravity. But his philosophical anthropology is largely positive in Lectures, primarily
because his concern is with natural duties associated with civil matters, not the ability to achieve
sufficient merit to achieve eternal life. Though not sufficient for eternal life, man is generally
sociable in the civil realm. Witherspoon writes with “undoubted certainty” that “in our nature, as
it is the work of God, there is a real goodwill and benevolence to others” and that the “principles
of our nature lead to society.”165 By nature, we, as social creatures, innately know that “our
happiness and the improvement of our powers are only to be had in society.”166 Is this sociability
consistent with Calvinism? Natural sociability is explicitly affirmed by Calvin.167 And as we saw
above, the effect of the fall was total but not equally destructive in every respect. Man, being an
“earthly” creature, continues to “cherish” society and flee from civil disorder. Indeed, for the
reasons given above a Calvinist ought to expect social solidarity in one form or another. Turretin
permitted calling the actions of non-Christians “virtuous” that conformed externally to the
natural law, and Althusius was willing to call non-Christians “innocent.” We should understand
Witherspoon’s use of the phrase “real goodwill” as referring to a certain public affection—a will
toward the public good. It is good, because the aim is rooted in the cherishing of society, not any
interest in the glory of the true God and his spiritual kingdom.168 There is no indication in the
text that “good-will” refers to a good will toward the true God revealed as Redeemer in scripture.
On the role of religion in civil society, Witherspoon states that the “[l]ove to God and
love to man is the substance of religion; when these prevail, civil laws will have little to do.”169
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For this reason, “virtue and piety are inseparably connected.”170 True religion produces true
virtue, and without the “proof of the being of God…moral sense would be weak and
insufficient.”171 Reformed Orthodox theologians affirmed a role for religion in civil society as
well. Pictet said that natural religion produced a “bond” of society. Turretin argued that religion
is “useful to men….as a bond of external discipline among men to prevent the world from
becoming utterly corrupt.172 Hence, religion is essential, or at least important, to the preservation
of civil society. Even the pagans recognized, according to Turretin, that the ground and author of
the natural law is God himself. He cites Cicero: “In all times and nations this universal law must
forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God
himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer.”173 The duties of man are intimately connected
with the divine. Natural law is not to be separated from natural religion. To disconnect piety with
duty to fellow man is to separate the law from its author, ground and enforcer. To put it in
Christian terms, to separate piety from civil righteousness is to break apart the law of God, being
composes of two tables—duty to God and duty to man. There is, then, no necessary contradiction
between Reformed theology and the promotion of public religion for the purpose of social
solidarity and public virtue. The primary purpose is true worship, but there is a secondary effect
of social solidary. And for this reason there is no contradiction between Calvinism and the
principles of republicanism, a contradiction asserted by Lynerd. Witherspoon’s (and other’s)
promotion of public morality through religion is exactly what a Calvinist ought to advocate.
An implication from all of this is the following. Since each individual, regardless of his
or her salvific relationship to God, has access, by reason, to the standard of right conduct, there is
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considerable overlap in potential knowledge between the Christian and the non-Christian. As
Reformed theologian David VanDrunen said concerning the Reformed view of natural law, there
is a “universally accessible standard.”174 While Christians might be held to additional duties
adventitious to nature revealed in scripture, there remains significant common ground between
Christians and non-Christians concerning right conduct and principles of political governance
and civil order. Further, Christians can praise non-Christians who make sound arguments for
various truths and can appropriate or use their arguments. Turretin, for example, called some of
Cicero’s philosophical arguments “weighty.”175 This significant common ground disconnects any
necessary connection between the soundness of one’s argument and their relationship to and
knowledge of God the Redeemer. Of course, the object of inquiry must be within the bounds of
reason, and the Socinians and Unitarians during the Founding era exceeded those bounds,
insisting on proofs from reason on matters the orthodox would consider above reason. In this
way, they were in error, according to Reformed Orthodoxy. But despite this error, when their
inquiry concerns natural objects – for example, natural law and natural theology – Christians can
meet them on common ground, accepting or rejecting their arguments as well as conducting
deliberation with them. It is even possible for Christians to be allied with non-Christian against
the thought of another group of Christians. When an orthodox Christian, then, appropriates or
borrows ideas from Enlightenment philosophers, the Christian has not abandoned his orthodoxy.
Nor does it make one’s thought some admixture of Christianity and Enlightenment. In large part,
the problems in the literature on Witherspoon (such as the two-hats views described above) and
the American Founding in general arise from an imprecise juxtaposition of Christianity and
Enlightenment. The latter is opposed to the former only when it calls into question its theological
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framework for the relationship of reason and revelation, which would include both the denial of
the possibility of theology and the demand for particular doctrines, traditionally thought
supernatural, to be proven by reason. But this gives plenty of room for the orthodox Founders to
accept all sorts of philosophical conclusions from the heterodox and not violate their orthodoxy.
Therefore, Witherspoon in his heavy borrowing from some of the Moderates (e.g., Reid
and Hutcheson) and from some more heretical authors (John Locke, Samuel Clarke and Joseph
Priestly) did not violate his orthodoxy. No position taken by Witherspoon from these
Enlightenment thinkers exceeds the bounds of reason established by his theological tradition. For
this reason, there is no evidence (and plenty of contrary evidence) justifying the claim that
Witherspoon is an Enlightenment thinker. What the literature lacks in its commentary on
Witherspoon, and other Founders, is a precise explanation on what counts as evidence of
unorthodoxy. It is not enough to show influence on Witherspoon from his heterodox
contemporaries and then question his orthodoxy. The issue is what type of influence. It does not
follow from the fact that Witherspoon found compelling Samuel Clarke’s and other antiTrinitarians’ arguments for the existence of God and other elements of natural theology that he
also accepted their view of reason. The issue between orthodoxy and Enlightenment is the place,
role, and limits of reason, not conclusions from reason. Nowhere does Witherspoon express a
view of reason outside the bounds of reason and revelation in Reformed Orthodoxy.
My discussion has, to my mind, sufficiently demonstrated the five theses I proposed in
the introduction. Witherspoon views reason as ancillary, confirmatory, and supportive of special
revelation. It is not above, nor the rule, standard or measure, of special revelation. He affirms
that only natural objects are proper objects of reason. His arguing for and from natural theology
and natural law is consistent with the Reformed tradition. Witherspoon explicitly recognizes a
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limit of reason consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy. Lastly, Witherspoon theological framework
for understanding the relationship of reason and revelation is both consistent with Reformed
Orthodoxy and makes possible legitimate and constructive cooperation and deliberation with
orthodox and heterodox on legitimate objects of reason, such as natural theology, natural law,
principles of governance, political right and duties, and other matters related to humankind’s
“earthly” existence. We can conclude then that Witherspoon was not an Enlightenment thinker in
opposition, wittingly or not, to his theological orthodoxy. Whatever one wants to call his
philosophical method, it is consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy.
To be sure, one can argue, perhaps rightly, that Witherspoon’s confidence in reason and
the common-sense philosophy popular at the time and later in the 19th century led him to an
optimism that proved to be damaging for religious belief, as George Marsden argued of
common-sense philosophy’s encounter with Darwinism in Fundamentalism and American
Culture.176 One could also argue that his Lectures might have sown seeds of doubt of religious
faith, however unintentionally, in some of his students due to the nature of its project. And one
could question the prudence of both his refusal to cite classical, medieval, and Reformed sources
in the lectures and his failure to provide a more nuanced and precise defense justifying an
orthodox Christian conducting such an inquiry. But none of these potential faults and lack of
prudence sufficiently show an abandonment of Reformed Orthodoxy in support of “Enlightened”
orthodoxy.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
My discussion of Witherspoon’s consistency with the Reformed tradition is best viewed
as a case study for a broader argument. A precise and nuanced presentation of Reformed
Orthodoxy, as I tried to provide above, sheds light on the religious and philosophical thought of
other Founders, such John Jay, James Wilson, Roger Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, and others, and
could shape our understanding of the relationship of religion to the American Founding. In the
literature, the Reformed tradition has been almost universally misunderstood, particularly the
tradition’s unity and diversity on matters such as reason, philosophy, natural law, and natural
theology. Scholars also mistakenly see a significant divergence between medieval scholasticism
and Reformed methodology. It is not the case that Reformed thinkers sought a complete reset of
Christian theology by rejecting the relevance of the Christian theological tradition(s).
Michael Zuckert, a political theorist who has written extensively on the subject of
religion and the American founding, is representative of those who have mischaracterized
Calvinism. He argues that there is a significant and fundamental discontinuity between the 17th
century American political thought, which came largely in the form of political theology, and
18th century American political thought, which was heavily influence by the philosophy of
Locke. The Mayflower Compact’s (1620) Christian theological language is nowhere found in the
Declaration of Independence, indicating a fundamental differences in starting points and purpose
for civil government. He writes, “The appeal to the divine in the Declaration is altogether
different, however: here it is ‘Nature’s God’ and his ‘Laws’, a God who speaks to humanity
through reason and acts in and through nature. His laws are none other than the laws of nature, as
understood by human reason….The truths [of the Declaration] are both accessible to and valid
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for all human beings; the principles of the Declaration are simply universal in character.”177
Given my evidence and discussion above, the problems here are fairly clear. There is nothing in
the Declaration that is inconsistent with Reformed Orthodoxy, though the language is not
exclusively from that tradition, nor points to it. So while I agree that there was discontinuity
between 17th and 18th century American political thought, this is not evident from the presence of
natural law language in the Declaration. It is evident rather from the absence of anything
exclusively Christian. We can consistently say that while the Declaration is not a Christian
document, it is still consistent with Christianity, according to the Reformed tradition.178 This
distinction is possible because there is nothing exclusively Christian about civil government. As
VanDrunen states in Reformed natural law there is a “universally accessible standard for the
development of civil laws.”179 The principles of government, justice, and civil decency are
common: all are under the divine government of God the Creator.
Zuckert also overestimates Locke’s accomplishment. He did not “break with all the
elements most characteristic of Protestant political thought,” as Zuckert claims, for not basing his
political thought on scripture. Locke’s appeal to natural law is, formally speaking, consistent
with Protestantism, even Reformed Protestantism. When scholars says the contrary, it is
indicative of confusion. Protestants cited scripture in developing the duties and arrangements of
political life only because the moral law in scripture is grounded in nature and is a surer means
of understanding nature. Political life and its obligations ultimately come from God via nature.
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As Reformed humanist, George Buchanan once said, “The voice of God and of nature is the
same.”180 Scripture presupposes this truth and clarifies natural law, as almost all Reformed
Orthodox theologians and political theorists up until Locke had said. (e.g., Calvin, Vermigli,
Junius, Zanchi, Althusius, Turretin etc.).181 Appealing to nature to theorize about human
government and political life makes perfect sense to a Reformed Christian. Politics is in the
realm of nature and nature’s God – God the Creator, not God the Redeemer.
This makes Harry Jaffa’s comment, cited by Zuckert, a false dichotomy: “the preamble to
the Declaration of Independence invokes not the God of Israel or the persons of the Trinity, but
the God of nature and is wholly a document of the rationalist tradition.”182 The God of nature in
Reformed theology is God the Creator, the same God who as creator revealed himself, by an
additional set of revelation, as a Redeemer. God’s intention with this further set of revealed
knowledge was to establish adventitious means to attain eternal life. And since human earthly
government is knowledge taken from God the Creator, there is no requirement that founding
documents mention the Trinity or Christ in the political documents, however ideal it might be,
for Christians to support both the government and the founding of it.
Even the New England Puritan John Cotton makes this distinction explicit: God the
Creator is the same God as the Triune God, yet God relates to man in different ways. He writes
in his “Discourses about Civil government,”
Though both [ecclesiastical and civil administration] agree in this, that God is the
Efficient and Author of them both and that by Christ, yet not eadem ratione. For,
God as the Creator and Governor of the World, is the Author of Civil Order and
Administrations: But God as in Covenant with his People in Christ, is the Author
of Church-Administration. So likewise Christ, as the Essential Word and Wisdom
of God creating and governing the World, is the Efficient and Fountain of Civil
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Order & Administration: But as Mediator of the New Covenant & Head of the
Church, he established Ecclesiastical Order.183
Cotton affirms that civil order is governed by the Creator, not the Mediator. And the covenant of
grace is with the Church, not with the civil government. The government is under the direction of
the knowledge given by the Creator. The government advances the spiritual and invisible
kingdom of Christ only extrinsically, as Turretin said.184 The magistrate is to care for the Church,
but he cannot advance the spiritual kingdom of God directly by his rule.
As Calvinist two-kingdom tradition has always said, the primary role of the civil
magistrate is to keep the peace and maintain good order.185 The chief end of government is not
the advancement of the spiritual kingdom of God, though this can and ideally should be one of
its accidental functions. But such advancement is proper only under certain circumstances. As
Althusius said, “Whoever therefore wishes to have a peaceful realm should abstain from
[religious] persecutions. He should not, however, permit the practice of a wicked religion lest
what occurred to Solomon may happen to him. But if he cannot prohibit it without hazard to the
commonwealth, he is to suffer it to exist in order that he not bring ruin to the commonwealth."186
Here we see the great principle of Protestant prudence. Reformed political thought is interested,
principally, in peace and this is achieve through prudential civil action. Winthrop, Cotton, and
signers of the Mayflower Compact were in positions to create and sustain a Christian
commonwealth, so they did or at least attempt to. But in a more pluralistic or multi-
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denominational situation (which includes people with positions traditionally considered
heterodox), there is need to follow the type of prudence prescribed by Althusius. Since the civil
government is a penultimate end for Reformed Christians (the ultimate being the celestial city, or
the heavenly and eternal New Jerusalem), prudence is for them a central principle of political
theory. The principle of prudence, informed by Protestant political theology, goes far in
explaining what led to the Declaration and why Protestant compromises can be principled ones.
These points have important implications on the use of Lockean political ideas in 18th
century colonial America and its founding era. Though the sudden adoption of Lockean political
philosophy is fairly clear, there is nothing prima facie inconsistent with Calvinists using it. What
I mean by prima facie is that there is nothing formally wrong with a Reformed Christian holding
to a philosopher’s answers to questions on earthly matters, and Locke’s political philosophy of
the Second Treatise deals with earthly matters. One could, formally speaking, consistently be
both a Lockean political theorist and be Reformed Orthodox. It could be, upon examining the
substance of the positions, that the positions are inconsistent with the Reformed political
tradition, but this is a different issue than whether the positions are within the bounds of reason.
Put differently, one is formally consistent with the Reformed theological framework of reason
and revelation when one’s beliefs do not violate the bounds of reason, even when those positions
are materially inconsistent with the Reformed tradition.
It needs to be emphasized that the primary dispute between the Reformed Orthodox and
other more “rationalist” groups on reason and revelation in the 17th century and beyond was not
over the use of reason per se, but over the proper bounds of reason. Turretin’s preoccupation
with boundaries is clear in the First Topic in his IET. Since in his political writings, Locke does
not exceed the bounds of reason, a Calvinist could adopt his philosophical conclusions without
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formally violating Reformed Orthodoxy. Even materially, it is not clear that much of Locke’s
political philosophy is inconsistent with that tradition. Calvinists, such as Phillipe de Mornay and
Samuel Rutherford, appealed to nature and reason, and used social contractarian arguments and
affirmed a similar view of natural equality in their political works.187 There is precedent, then,
for the Calvinist use of what became Lockean liberalism.
Witherspoon and the rest of the Founding generation found themselves in what was
already a religiously and denominationally pluralistic society. Though most people identified as
Christian, it was not possible to maintain peace and order with an established national church.
However ideal establishment might be, it was not conducive to peace, civil security, and
tranquility. The members of the Founding generation, including Witherspoon, understood what
was at stake and they applied prudence, informed through experience, to establish a viable
system of government. To accomplish this, Founders of various religious backgrounds had to
work together, which demanded some universal basis of deliberation. Calvinists, Anglicans,
Arminians, Roman Catholics, Unitarians, and deists had to cooperate. What made Witherspoon’s
and the other Calvinists’ cooperation possible and principled was their own tradition. Since it
recognized the universality of the natural law, that civil society and government is natural, that
reason is not wholly unreliable on civil matters, and that ecclesiastical establishment, however
ideal, is not the ultimate end of civil government, they were able to constructively work well
with their fellow patriots.
For this reason, we should understand Witherspoon's Lectures not only as a philosophical
attempt to show the complementarity and completeness of reason and revelation for apologetic
purposes. The lectures were also meant to shape the thinking of future statesmen. After all, he
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envisioned Princeton as a school that primarily produced effective statesmen. In his "Address to
the Inhabitants of Jamaica," he says that the primary benefit of education is the opportunity to
use one's "talents to the service of the public and good of mankind...[and] to the benefit of
society and in office of power or trust."188 Since public leadership and serving the public in
offices of power required having the right knowledge and methods necessary to converse and
deliberate with a diverse populous, he taught the universal language of natural law and
philosophy. He was responding to the times and being practical. Only statesmen who understand
contemporary issues and arguments and understood the methodology behind them could
effectively participate in intellectual society. His Lectures, while providing arguments supportive
of revelation, also served to produce effective public leaders.
What does this tell us about America’s Founding? What is the role of Reformed theology
in the Founding? Despite the fact that the Founding did not institutionally, constitutionally, or
officially establish an orthodox Reformed (let alone Protestant) nation, the Founding is still
consistent with orthodox Reformed principles. It is possible for a country’s founding principles,
institutions, and constitution to be consistent with orthodox Reformed Protestantism, even when
the founding does not establish an explicitly Protestant constitution, state, or government. Put
differently, there need not be a reference to Christianity and the Bible in the founding documents
for those documents to be consistent with Christianity and the Bible. Reformed Christians would
ideally want to see some recognition of Christ as the ultimate sovereign and king, but such
recognition is not absolutely necessary for a civil administration intent on establishing civil
peace and tranquility.
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This is where a balance needs to be struck between the “Christian America” advocates,
who see the Founding a Christian founding, and the secular or deistical understandings of the
Founding. My argument here suggests that the Founding is not uniquely or exclusively a
Christian founding, but at the same time it is not inconsistent with Christianity, including
Reformed Christianity. In this way, the Founding was indeed a compromise by Reformed
Christians, but it was not an unprincipled one.
The focus of this paper was narrow, yet it has huge implications. Witherspoon is just one
of many of the Founders whose theological positions and philosophical methods can be brought
to consistency with a clear understanding of the Reformed tradition on the relationship of reason
and revelation. The nature of the Founding itself is clarified as well. What all this suggests is that
while there was discontinuity between 17th and 18th century American political thought in terms
of religious establishment and the use of exclusively Christian language, there was, one could
argue, an underlying and more fundamental continuity: the penultimacy of civil society and
government and the principle of prudence aimed at the peace, tranquility, security of civil
society. In this light, orthodox Founders, such as Witherspoon, took part in a fundamental
continuity while engineering the necessary discontinuity.
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